For the last 40 years, Americans have lagged in recognizing the declining fortunes of their foreign rivals. In the 1970s they thought the Soviet Union was 10 feet tall -- ascendant even though corruption and inefficiency were destroying the vital organs of a decaying communist regime. In the late 1980s, they feared that Japan was going to economically overtake the United States, yet the crony capitalism, speculative madness, and political corruption evident throughout the 1980s led to the collapse of the Japanese economy in 1991.
在过去的40年里，美国人对竞争对手的衰退都是后知后觉。在20世纪70年代，他们觉得苏联高不可攀——其实腐败和低效正逐步侵蚀着这个共产主义政体的各个要害部门。在19世纪80年代后期，他们担心日本会在经济上超越美国。然而，贯穿日本整个上个世纪80年的代裙带资本主义、疯狂的投资和政治腐败却让日本的经济在1991年崩溃。
Could the same malady have struck Americans when it comes to China? The latest news from Beijing is indicative of Chinese weakness: a persistent slowdown of economic growth, a glut of unsold goods, rising bad bank loans, a bursting real estate bubble, and a vicious power struggle at the top, coupled with unending political scandals. Many factors that have powered China's rise, such as the demographic dividend, disregard for the environment, supercheap labor, and virtually unlimited access to external markets, are either receding or disappearing.
当中国也开始走下坡路的时候，美国还会犯之前的毛病吗？最近从北京传来的新闻暴露出了中国的弱点：经济增长的持续放缓，大量货物囤积、银行不良借贷攀升、地产泡沫爆破，以及高层的政治斗争和没完没了的政治谣言。中国崛起的很多因素，像人口红利、毫不顾及环境问题、非常廉价的劳动力，以及广阔的出口市场等，都在减弱或者消失。
Yet China's declining fortunes have not registered with U.S. elites, let alone the American public. President Barack Obama's much-hyped "pivot to Asia, " announced last November, is premised on the continuing rise of China; the Pentagon has said that by 2020 roughly 60 percent of the Navy's fleet will be stationed in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington is also considering deployingsea - borne anti-missile systems in East Asia, a move reflecting U.S. worries about China's growing missile capabilities.
但中国国力衰退这信息还没有被美国精英阶层所接收，更别提美国的普罗大众。总统巴拉克·奥巴马在去年十月激昂的宣讲——“向亚洲转移”（pivot to Asia）——正是基于中国的持续发展提出的；五角大楼称，到2020年，美国海军有大约六成驻在亚太区域。华盛顿也正在考虑在东亚布置海基反导弹系统，这个举动反映出美国对中国导弹技术进步的担忧。
In the lead-up to the Nov. 6 U.S. presidential election, both Democrats and Republicans have emphasized perceived Chinese strength for reasons of both national security and political expediency. Democrats use China's growing economic might to call for more government investment in education and green technology. In late August, the Center for American Progress and the Center for the Next Generation, two left-leaning think tanks, released a report forecasting that China will have 200 million college graduates by 2030. The report (which also estimates India's progress in creating human capital) paints a grim picture of U.S. decline and demands decisive action. Republicans justify increasing defense spending in this era of sky-high deficits in part by citing predictions that China's military capabilities will continue to grow as the country's economy expands. The 2012 Republican Party platform, released in late August at the Republican National Convention, says, "In the face of China's accelerated military build-up, the United States and our allies must maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors."
在为11月6日的总统竞选准备过程中，民主共和两党都出于国家安全和政治利益而强调中国的国力。民主党做中国经济增长的文章，可能是为了得到政府在教育和环保技术上更多的投资。在去年8月，两个左倾智库美国进步中和后代中心（Center for the Next Generation）发表了一篇报告预测中国的大学毕业生将在2030年达到2亿。该报告(还预测印度人力资本的进展）描绘了一幅美国衰落的冷酷景象，并要求采取进一步的果断行动。共和党则通过引用对中国军事实力会随着其经济增长而增强的预测，为不断增长的国防开资导致的严重赤字辩护。在2012年的共和党的网络平台上发布了去年8月的共和党全国代表大会的会议内容，称：“面对中国加速增长的军事建设，美国和我们的盟友必须保持适当的军事实力，以挫败中国对邻国的侵略或高压行为。”
The disconnect between the brewing troubles in China and the seemingly unshakable perception of Chinese strength persists even though the U.S. media accurately cover China, in particular the country's inner fragilities. One explanation for this disconnect is that elites and ordinary Americans remain poorly informed about China and the nature of its economic challenges in the coming decades. The current economic slowdown in Beijing is neither cyclical nor the result of weak external demand for Chinese goods. China's economic ills are far more deeply rooted: an overbearing state squandering capital and squeezing out the private sector, systemic inefficiency and lack of innovation, a rapacious ruling elite interested solely in self-enrichment and the perpetuation of its privileges, a woefully underdeveloped financial sector, and mounting ecological and demographic pressures. Yet even for those who follow China, the prevailing wisdom is that though China has entered a rough patch, its fundamentals remain strong.
中国暗涌的危机和对中国强大实力挥之难去的观念之间的分裂一直存在，尽管美国媒体已经很精准地披露过中国的问题，尤其是这个国家内在的脆弱。这种分裂的一个解释是，美国的精英和一般美国人还是对中国和这个国家在接下来的几十年所带来的经济挑战的性质还是非常不了解。当前，中国的经济放缓既不是周期性的，也不是外围对中国商品需求的减弱导致的。中国的经济问题比这要来得深：国有资本超重负担、民营企业萎缩、系统低效和缺少创新、贪婪的精英统治阶层只关心中饱私囊和他们地位的稳固、发展严重滞后的金融产业、日益严重的生态问题和人口压力。然而，对于那些一直关注中国的人来说，盛行的观点却是，虽然中国已经进入比较困难的时期，但它的基础还是牢固的。
Americans' domestic perceptions influence how they see their rivals. It is no coincidence that the period in the 1970s and late 1980s when Americans missed signs of rivals' decline corresponded with intense dissatisfaction with U.S. performance (President Jimmy Carter's 1979 "malaise speech, " for example). Today, a China whose growth rate is falling from 10 to 8 percent a year (for now) looks pretty good in comparison with an America where annual growth languishes at below 2 percent and unemployment stays above 8 percent. In the eyes of many Americans, things may be bad over there, but they are much worse here.
美国国内的观点影响了他们如何看待他们的对手。在上世纪70年代和80年代，美国没有及时发现对手衰败的信号，和对美国表现的强烈不满有关。这并非巧合。现在，中国的增长率从每年10%降到8%，但和那个年增长率在2%以下，而失业率却维持在8%以上的美国相比，却显得非常可观。在很多美国人的眼中，彼处可能很糟糕，但这里就更惨烈了。
Perceptions of a strong and pushy China also persist because of Beijing's own behavior. The ruling Chinese Communist Party continues to exploit nationalist sentiments to bolster its credentials as the defender of China's national honor. Chinese state media and history textbooks have fed the younger generation such a diet of distorted, jingoistic facts, outright lies, and nationalist myths that it is easy to provoke anti-Western or anti-Japanese sentiments. Even more worrisome is Beijing's uncompromising stance on territorial disputes with America's key Asian allies, such as Japan and the Philippines. The risk that a contest over disputed maritime territories, especially in the South China Sea, could lead to real armed conflict makes many in the United States believe that they cannot let down their guard against China.
北京自身的一些表现也加深了对中国的强大又强硬的印象。统治中国的共产党继续煽动民族主义情绪，以让人相信它一直在维护国家荣誉。中国国营媒体和历史教科书已经给年轻一代灌输了混乱的，沙文主义的观念、谎言，以及民族主义神话，这使得反西方和反日的情绪非常容易被挑起。更让人担心的是北京政府与美国在亚洲的重要盟友——菲律宾和日本——在领土争议上毫不妥协的立场。在受争议的领海问题——尤其是南中国海——的争论，可能引发真正的军事冲突的危险，使得很多在美国的人认为他们不能减少对中国的防备。
Sadly, this gap between the American perception of Chinese strength and the reality of Chinese weakness has real adverse consequences. Beijing will use China-bashing rhetoric and the strengthening U.S. defense posture in East Asia as ironclad evidence of Washington's unfriendliness. The Communist Party will blame the United States for its economic difficulties and diplomatic setbacks. Xenophobia could become an asset for a regime struggling for survival in hard times. Many Chinese already hold the United States responsible for the recent escalations in the South China Seadispute and think the United States goaded Hanoi and Manila into confrontation.
可悲的是，美国对中国实力的理解与中国有很多毛病的现实的断裂，会导致不利的结果。北京会把对中国的抨击和美国在东亚加强防御的姿态作为美国不友好的铁证。共产党将之归咎于美国的经济困难和外交挫败。仇外情绪会变成一个地区在艰难时刻求存的武器。很多中国人早就认为美国应该为南中国海争议的升级负责，并认为美国鼓励越南和菲律宾与中国对抗。
The most consequential effect of this disconnect is the loss of an opportunity both to rethink U.S. China policy and to prepare for possible discontinuity in China's trajectory in the coming two decades. The central pillar of Washington's China policy is the continuation of the status quo, a world in which the Communist Party's rule is assumed to endure for decades. Similar assumptions underpinned Washington's policies toward the former Soviet Union, Suharto's Indonesia, and more recently Hosni Mubarak's Egypt and Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya. Discounting the probability of regime change in seemingly invulnerable autocracies has always been an ingrained habit in Washington.
这种分裂最直接的效果是，失去重新思考美中关系和为中国在接下来20年里可能出现的断裂做准备。美国对中国政策的中心是维持现状：共产党的统治估计还能维持几十年。这种估计类似于美国对待前苏联、苏哈托时期的印度尼西亚，以及最近穆巴拉克时期的埃及和卡扎菲时期的利比亚。美国一个顽固的习惯就是忽视那些看起来无懈可击的独裁政权有变更的可能。
The United States should reassess the basic premises of its China policy and seriously consider an alternative strategy, one based on the assumption of declining Chinese strength and rising probability of an unexpected democratic transition in the coming two decades. Should such a change come, the geopolitical landscape of Asia would transform beyond recognition. The North Korean regime would collapse almost overnight, and the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. A regional wave of democratic transitions would topple the communist regimes in Vietnam and Laos. The biggest and most important unknown, however, is about China itself: Can a weak or weakening country of 1.3 billion manage a peaceful transition to democracy?
美国应当重新审视对华政策的基础，并基于对未来20年中国国力的衰退和可能出现的民主转型，制定另外的战略。这种改变一旦发生，亚洲的地缘政治变化将超出美国的认知能力。朝鲜政权可能一夜之间崩塌，朝鲜半岛可能会统一。民主转型也将推翻越南和老挝的共产党政权。而最大的，也是最重要的未知之数却在于中国自身：一个脆弱，且变得更加脆弱的国家，一个13亿人口的国家，可以和平地实现民主转型吗？
It is of course premature to completely write off the Communist Party's capacity for adaptation and renewal. China could come roaring back in a few years, and the United States should not ignore this possibility. But the party's demise can't be ruled out, and the current signs of trouble in China have provided invaluable clues to such a highly probable seismic shift. U.S. policymakers would be committing another strategic error of historic proportions if they miss or misread them.
当然，现在就断言共产党没有能力去适应和革新，则言之过早。在未来几年，中国还是有恢复的可能，而美国也不该忽视这点。但不能排除共产党下台的可能，而最近中国出现麻烦的信号已经为大变动的可能性提供了重要线索。如果美国的政策制定者错过或者误读了这些信号，他们或将再犯一次历史性的重大战略失误。
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