The computer, smartphone or other electronic device on which you may be reading this article, tracking the Animals, ” officially declaring that nonhuman animals, “including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, ” are conscious.
大多数科学家会认为，并非宇宙中的所有物质都有意识。只有一小部分有相对复杂大脑的动物才有意识。然而，科学家对于动物行为和大脑解剖的深入研究发现，意识似乎万物皆有。不必复杂到人脑程度的大脑也可以有意识。在今年（2012）的7月7日，一群神经系统科学家聚集在剑桥大学，签署了一份题为“关于非人类动物存在意识的剑桥宣言”，正式宣布，非人类动物，“包括所有哺乳类动物和鸟类，一起许多其他物种，包括章鱼，”都有意识。
Humans are more than just conscious; they are also self-aware. Scientists differ on how they distinguish between consciousness and self-awareness, but here is one common distinction: consciousness is awareness of your body and your environment; self-awareness is recognition of that consciousness—not only understanding that you exist but further comprehending that you are aware of your existence. Another way of considering it: to be conscious is to think; to be self-aware is to realize that you are a thinking being and to think about your thoughts. Presumably human infants are conscious—they perceive and respond to people and things around them—but they are not yet self-aware. In their first years of life, children develop a sense of self, learning to recognize themselves in the mirror and to distinguish between their own point of view and the perspectives of other people.
人类不仅有意识；他们有自我意识。科学家有不同的方法区别“意识”和“自我意识”，其中的共同点是：意识是你对你身体和周围环境的知觉；自我意识是对该意识的知觉——不仅知道你存在，并进一步理解你对你的存在的知晓。另一种说法是：有意识即会思考；有自我意识即明白你是一个会思考的生物，并思考你的思想。我们可以假定，人类婴儿是有意识的——他们对周围的人和物有认知并能反应，但他们还没有自我意识。在他们人生中的第一年，小孩子会发展出关于“自己”的认知，学着在镜子里认出自己，并分辨他们自己的视角和其他人的视角。
Numerous neuroimaging studies have suggested that thinking about ourselves, recognizing images of ourselves, and reflecting on our thoughts and feelings—that is, different forms of self-awareness—all involve the cerebral cortex, the outermost, intricately wrinkled part of the brain. The fact that humans have a particularly large and wrinkly cerebral cortex relative to body size supposedly explains why we seem to be more self-aware than most other animals. But new evidence is casting doubt on this idea.
许多神经影像研究都指出，思考自己，认出自己的形象，并反思我们的思想和感受——即另一种自我意识——都与大脑皮层相关，那是大脑最外面的、褶皱凌乱密布的部分。人类拥有与其体积相应的大片皱褶大脑皮层应该可以解释为什么我们似乎比其他动物更具自我意识。但新的研究对此提出了质疑。
“Got a Towel?”
“拿毛巾了吗？”
If this anatomical hypothesis were correct, we would expect, for example, that a man missing huge portions of his cerebral cortex would lose at least some of his self-awareness. Patient R, also known as Roger, defies that expectation. Roger is a 57-year-old man who suffered extensive brain damage in 1980 after a severe bout of herpes simplex encephalitis, an inflammation of the brain caused by herpesvirus. The disease destroyed most of Roger's insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex, regions near or at the front surface of the brain that are thought to be essential for self-awareness. About 10 percent of his insula remains and only 1 percent of his anterior cingulate cortex.
如果这个解剖学假说是正确的，我们就可以推断，比如说，一个丢失了大部分大脑皮层的人至少会失去部分自我意识。患者R，也叫Roger，否定了这一推论。Roger是一名57岁的男性，1980年在一次单纯疱疹脑炎后大脑严重损伤，那是一种由疱疹病毒引发的脑炎。这个病毁掉了Roger大部分的脑岛、前扣带回和内侧前额叶皮质，这些靠近大脑表层或在其前面的部分被认为是对自我意识最重要的部分。他只剩下了大约十分之一的脑岛和百分之一的前扣带回。
Roger cannot remember much of what happened to him between 1970 and 1980, and he has great difficulty forming new memories. He cannot taste or smell either. But he still knows who he is. He recognizes himself in the mirror and in photographs, and his behavior is relatively normal.
Roger忘记了大部分发生在1970到1980年间他自己的事，他也很难形成新的记忆。他也尝不到闻不到味道。但他仍然知道自己是谁。他能在镜子里和照片里认得自己，他的行为也挺正常的。
In a paper published earlier this year postdoctoral researcher Carissa L. Philippi of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and neuroscientist David Rudrauf of the University of Iowa and their colleagues investigated the extent of Roger's self-awareness. In a mirror-recognition task, for example, a researcher pretended to brush something off of Roger's nose with a tissue that concealed black eye shadow. Fifteen minutes later the researcher asked Roger to look at himself in the mirror. Roger immediately rubbed away the black smudge on his nose and wondered aloud how it got there.
在今年早些出版的一篇论文中，威斯康星-麦迪逊大学博士后研究员卡莉莎腓立比（Carissa L. Philippi），爱荷华大学神经系统学家大卫鲁德洛夫（David Rfdrauf）及他们的同事研究了Roger自我意识的程度。在一个“认知镜像”的任务中，一个研究员假装从Roger的鼻子上用一张纸巾刷走一些东西，纸巾上藏着黑色的眼影。15分钟之后，研究员让Roger看看镜子里的自己。Roger马上把鼻子上的黑东西擦走，并大声问那是怎么弄上去的。
The researchers also showed Roger pictures of himself, of people he knew and of strangers. He almost always recognized himself and never mistook another person for himself. He did sometimes have difficulty recognizing a photo of his face when it appeared by itself on a black background, without any hair or clothing.
研究员还让Roger看他自己的、他认识的人的、和陌生人的照片。他几乎总能认出自己，并从来不会把别人错认为自己。有时，当他的脸单独出现在黑色背景的一张照片上，没有任何头发或衣物时，他的确不大能认出来。
Roger also distinguished the sensation of tickling himself from the feeling of someone else tickling him and consistently found the latter more stimulating. When one researcher asked for permission to tickle Roger's armpits, he replied, “Got a towel?” As Philippi and Rudrauf note, Roger's quick wit indicates that in addition to maintaining a sense of self, he adopts the perspective of others—a talent known as theory of mind. He anticipated that the researcher would notice his sweaty armpits and used humor to preempt any awkwardness.
Roger还能分辨出他自己挠自己痒痒和别人挠他痒痒的感觉，并且总觉得后者更刺激。当一位研究员问他是否可以挠他的胳肢窝时，他说，“拿毛巾了吗？”腓立比和鲁德洛夫认为，Roger的机智意味着除了保持自我意识以外，他还能了解其他人的看法——这种技能被称为心智理论。他估计研究员会留意到他的胳肢窝有汗，并通过幽默的方式来提前解除尴尬。
In another task, Roger had to use a computer mouse to drag a blue box from the center of a computer screen toward a green box in one of the corners of the screen. In some cases, the program gave him complete control over the blue box; in other cases, the program restricted his control. Roger easily discriminated between sessions in which he had full control and times when some other force was at work. In other words, he understood when he was and was not responsible for certain actions.
在另一个任务中，Roger要用电脑鼠标把一个蓝色的盒子从电脑屏幕的中间拉到屏幕角落的一个绿色盒子中。有时，程序让他可以完全控制蓝色盒子，有时，程序会约束他的控制。Roger能轻易地分出两种情况，即他有完全控制权的时候和有其他力量在运作的时候。换句话说，他知道什么是他做的，什么不是他做的。
Given the evidence of Roger's largely intact self-awareness, Philippi, Rudrauf and their colleagues argue that the insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex cannot by themselves account for conscious recognition of oneself as a thinking being. Instead they propose that self-awareness is a far more diffuse cognitive process, relying on many parts of the brain, including regions not located in the cerebral cortex.
既然Roger的自我意识基本上没有受损，腓立比和鲁德洛夫及其同事认为，脑岛、前扣带回和内侧前额叶皮质本身不能解释一个有思考能力的生物的意识。他们提出，自我意识是一个更分散的认知过程，依赖大脑的许多部分，包括不在大脑皮层上的部分。
Laughing without a Brain
无脑大笑
In the new study, Philippi, Rudrauf and their co-authors point to a fascinating 1999 review of children with hydranencephaly, a rare disorder in which fluid-filled sacs replace the brain's cerebral hemispheres. Children with hydranencephaly are essentially missing every part of their brain except for the brain stem and cerebellum and a few other structures. Holding a light near such a child's head illuminates the skull like a jack-o'-lantern.
在新的研究中，腓立比、鲁德洛夫及其同事指向了1999年一份引人入胜的关于患有积水性无脑儿童的研究，这是一种罕见的病症，患者的大脑半球成了充满液体的囊。患有此症的儿童基本上只剩下脑干、小脑和其他少量结构。在灯光下，他们的脑袋就像空心南瓜灯一样。
Although many children with hydranencephaly appear relatively normal at birth, they often quickly develop growth problems, seizures and impaired vision. Most die within a year; some live for years or even decades. Such children lack a cerebral cortex, but at least a few give every appearance of genuine consciousness. They respond to people and things in their environment. They smile, laugh and cry. They know the difference between familiar people and strangers. And they prefer some kinds of music to others. If some children with hydranencephaly are conscious, then the brain does not require an intact cerebral cortex to produce consciousness.
虽然许多患有积水性无脑的孩子在出生时看起来很正常，他们通常很快就开始有生长问题，视力受损甚至失明。大多数会在第一年死去，有些可以存活几年甚至十年。这些孩子没有大脑皮层，但其中至少有一些表现出自发的意识。他们对周遭的人和物有反应。他们会微笑、大笑和哭泣。他们分得出熟人和陌生人。他们会喜欢某一类音乐。如果不分积水性无脑儿童有意识，那么大脑其实不一定需要大脑皮层来产生意识。
Whether such children are truly self-aware is more difficult to answer, especially as they cannot communicate with language. In the 1999 review one child showed intense fascination with his reflection in a mirror, but it is not clear whether he recognized his reflection as his own. Still, research on hydranencephaly and Roger's case study indicate that self-awareness—this ostensibly sophisticated and unique cognitive process layered on consciousness—might be more universal than we realized.
这些孩子是否真的有自我意识则是一个比较难回答的问题，尤其是当他们不能用语言沟通时。在1999年的研究中，有一个孩子对他在镜中的影像特别着迷，但不清楚他是否认出那是自己。但是，关于积水性无脑症的研究和Roger的案例表明，自我意识——这个表面上精巧而独特的在意识之上认知过程——可能比我们所了解的更广泛地存在。
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